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The housing project, spatial
experimentation and legal
transformation in mid-twentieth
century New York City
Tarsha Finney Royal College of Art, London, UK (Author’s e-mail
address: tarsha.finney@rca.ac.uk)
It is on the grounds of ‘eminent domain’ and in the context of the great urban transform-
ations that the city of New York underwent through the twentieth century that so much cri-
ticism is launched at urban actors such as Robert Moses. Blight often constituted the ground
of legitimacy for the use of eminent domain. Blight is often condemned for its definitional
ambiguity by both legal and urban historians. Yet if it is considered at the intersection of
urban spatial reasoning’s experimentation with the size of the neighbourhood in relation
to the housing project, and at the point where it collides with legal argument and jurispru-
dential challenge around the notion of public benefit, it is possible to see an incredible pro-
ductivity at work in the notion of blight. This paper argues that it is in fact the
instrumentality of this definitional ambiguity that galvanises a broad and diverse dispute
around housing. Rather than simply reflecting legal change, here the typological and dia-
grammatic spatial experimentation at work in the coming-into-form of the housing project
can be seen iteratively to nudge transformation in legal and constitutional definition. This
suggests a quite different kind of directed and specific material politics than that typically
attributed to architecture’s disciplinary skill set.
Introduction
It is on the grounds of the use of ‘eminent domain’
that so much criticism is launched at figures such as
Robert Moses, the urban actor who did so much to
reshape the city of New York during the middle of
the twentieth century. An indication of the contin-
ued contemporary anxiety around its use in the reor-
ganisation of cities in the USA can be seen in the
response to the much more recent 2005 case of
Kelo v. the City of New London.1 This ruling reaf-
firmed the earlier 1954 Berman v Parker Supreme
Court judgement which had found that, after
much state-based, contradictory jurisprudential
testing through the late-nineteenth and into the
first half of the twentieth century, public use, under-
stood as ‘public benefit’ as the grounds for the
forced taking of land, could be extended in defi-
nition to include economic benefit within the
‘takings’ clause of the Fifth Amendment of the US
Constitution: ‘nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation’.2 For
writers such as Robert Caro, in his epic account of
Robert Moses, The Power Broker, or Richard
Plunz’s significant History of Housing in the City of
New York, it was this shift in the 1950s that
marked the broad untethering of the bulldozer to
act on the slums, tenements, streets and neighbour-
hoods of New York, making way for new housing
and infrastructure.3
In the immediate aftermath of the 2005 judge-
ment, and with the concern that this power of
eminent domain had once again been unleashed
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in cities across America, twenty-two states moved to
amend substantially their state-based eminent
domain laws, an indication of just how feared
these laws of physical takings were. In doing so
these states restricted the use of eminent domain,
and with it the possibility that there might once
again be the broad exercise of physical takings in
cities and urban centres.4
Central to state and federal challenges to the use
of eminent domain has been an ambiguity regarding
the definition of public use as the grounds for claim-
ing legitimacy in taking. The question of financial
compensation is quickly resolved through indepen-
dent evaluation, so it is on this secondary issue of
public use that any challenge rests.
Recent writing in response to the consequences
of Kelo v. the City of New London, such as Kelly
in the Cornell Law Review, has argued for clarifica-
tion of the definition of public use as the advance-
ment of social welfare.5 This is an attempt to
address its use through arguments resting on
broad notions of economic benefit.6 Heller + Krier
have written that the ‘Supreme Court decisions
over the last three-quarters of a century have
turned the words of the takings clause into a
secret code that only a momentary majority of the
Court is able to understand.’7 This follows on
from a damning 1949 account of the jurispruden-
tial testing of eminent domain in the Yale Law
Review, the editorial describing a ‘massive body of
case law, irreconcilable in its inconsistency, confus-
ing in its detail and defiant of all attempts at classi-
fication.’8 Kelly has also argued that ‘despite
numerous attempts to understand the Public Use
Clause, both courts and legal commentators have
failed to provide an intellectually compelling
interpretation.’9
The use of eminent domain through the first half
of the twentieth century and leading up to the
1954 case appears on review less as an argument
for the production of housing, and more the tool
for the clearing of the city of substandard and
unsanitary urban fabric, and where the basis of
claiming the ‘right to take’ was in a constant
process of definitional change. The housing refor-
mer and planner Tracey B Auger, writing in the
1930s, argued that the housing project Stuyvesant
Town ‘ …was held not to be concerned with low
rent housing for persons of low income, but to
be justified on the grounds that it would result in
the clearance and rehabilitation of substandard
and insanitary areas. In short, a public subsidy is
being granted not to get something that the
public wants so much as to get rid of something
that the public considers disadvantageous.’10 Fur-
thermore, the manual accompanying Title I of the
American Housing Act of 1949, the Title that
paved the way for ‘slum clearance’, explained
that ‘patching up hopelessly worn out buildings
on a temporary or minimum basis presents the
possible result of slum preservation rather than
slum clearance… ..To achieve area-wide change,
the solution was to aggregate large properties,
clear them and rebuild on a large scale.’11 In one
way eminent domain was the mechanism that
enabled this work.
For legal historians making an account of this
change, but also for those writing urban histories
of change and transformation, such as Plunz and
Caro, the definitional elasticity of the notion of
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public use is deeply troubling. It is understood as
the mechanism that is open to abuse by those
interested only in financial gain, at the expense
of neighbourhoods and communities dislocated,
whilst the architectural object delivered on the
occasion of change, the housing project, stands
mute, a reflection of a series of legal, social and
political changes external to it and occurring
around it.
The ambition of this paper is to make visible
these transformations from another angle, where
urban spatial reasoning’s experimentation with
the size and scale of stable and dynamic neighbour-
hoods, and their animating condition of commu-
nity, collides with legal argument and definitional
challenge. Here, the ambiguity of concepts under-
pinning and galvanising arguments, such as those
to do with blight, begin to appear less troubling,
and can in fact be revealed to be very productive.
As this paper will show, blight, understood as a dis-
cursive strategy, can be seen to bring together dis-
puting social reform agendas, property interests
and housing philanthropists. At the same time,
the spatial reasoning at work through a series of
housing projects can be seen to push at the defini-
tional boundaries of legal doctrine through juris-
prudential testing of notions such as public
benefit in the state and federal courts. Here the
use of mechanisms such as excess condemnation
might be understood to be less the driver of archi-
tectural change, and more the consequence of
architectural experimentation, part of a constant
questioning of the size and scale of stable neigh-
bourhoods and their animating condition of
dynamic community.
The strategic exemplar diagram of the
neighbourhood unit
We take for granted the idea that to think of the
housing project, one is always thinking of urban
infrastructure at the same time. However, by the
late 1940s these had only just been linked in legis-
lation through Title I of the American Housing Act.
Now we understand that to work on housing is to
work on the city itself: to take a site, abstract it,
make it malleable, work on it and then put it back
in a new articulation of the elements of work,
home, leisure and transport. We expect the interven-
tion to have an effect on its occupants, on the neigh-
bourhood, on the city around it, at multiple scales in
an iterative relationship of feedback within a trajec-
tory of experimentation. It is possible to see contin-
ued evidence of this in a catalogue of new
publications on housing that have emerged in the
last fifteen years, including publications such as the
Floor Plan Manual, D-Book: Density and New
Urban Housing.12
This is not an argument for architectural determin-
ism. To be involved in this work does not mean that
one believes that buildings make their occupants act
in specific ways. But it is recognition that the work of
spatial reasoning, which is at the heart of the design
process, and where it intersects with a governmental
logic, positions us in a speculative relationship to
each other, at multiple scales, in the interest of par-
ticular discursive issues: neighbourhood and its ani-
mating condition of ‘community’, as we shall see
here, or the single-family dwelling and the dynamic
organisation of the modern family, which is consti-
tuted agonistically between subject positions of
mother, father and gender-specific child. From the
3
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point of view of design, these relationships are
speculative because the design process is iterative
and cumulative, it acts, reflects, critiques, diagnoses
and projects. In the early 1940s, however, this
relationship between design and social constitution
at the scale of neighbourhood was newly estab-
lished.
Writing for the ‘Proceedings in Joint National Con-
ference on Housing in Chicago’ in 1936, the housing
reformer Tracey B. Augur asked:
What does a wholesome community structure
look like, and how does one lay out a housing
site to approximate it?… . Sir Ebenezer Howard
and Clarence Perry give us the first lead. Before
(undertaking) site design we must begin with a
unit of urban life that is capable of maintaining
itself…Howard set up the Garden City as a type
of metropolitan unit that could survive as a well-
rounded healthy community uninfluenced by the
ups and downs of urban life round it. Perry
carried the same idea into the internal structure
of cities in his neighbourhood unit, a residential
cell capable of building up a community’s life…
capable of resisting tendencies to depreciation
and disintegration.13
The ‘neighbourhood unit’ was first published as a
diagram by the Russell Sage Foundation as part of
the 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Its Envir-
ons,14 produced by the urban reformer Clarence
Arthur Perry (Fig. 1). Entitled ‘The Neighbourhood
Unit, a Scheme of Arrangement for the Family life
Community’, it existed in less coherent forms as a
concept as early as 1923, with Perry presenting it
in that year at a joint meeting of the National Com-
munity Centre Association and the American Socio-
logical Society in Washington DC as part of a paper
entitled ‘A Community Unit in City Planning and
Development’.15 Described in the Regional Plan as
a ‘blueprint for residential neighbourhoods of the
future’,16 the neighbourhood unit plan describes a
new scale at which there could be material and
organisational experimentation concerning the size
and arrangement of the elements of collective life
in the city: home, work, transport, leisure. Central
to its reasoning, as Augur recognised, is this idea
of resistance to the tendency to ‘depreciation and
disintegration’.
The diagram of the neighbourhood unit as it was
published in 1929 shows a residential area of single
dwellings bounded by arterial roads lined with retail
and commercial development that act something
like high streets. At its centre, and only ever a
quarter-mile walk from these edge conditions, are
the collective spaces of communal life: a park, a
church or place of worship, a community centre
and an elementary school. Ten percent of the total
area of the plan was to be set aside as park and rec-
reational areas. Through traffic was discouraged and
held at the periphery by the wall of commercial
development, whilst the internal streets often curve
as cul de sacs. At approximately one hundred and
sixty acres with around ten residential units per
acre, the neighbourhood unit as proposed in 1929
was to house 5,000–9,000 residents, enough
people to support the elementary school at its
heart, which incorporated sporting facilities for com-
munity use.17
We might call Perry’s 1929 drawing a strategic
exemplar diagram. Whilst never actually built
exactly so, it continues to be the model against
4
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Figure 1. Neighbourhood
Unit Plan: C.A Perry
‘The Neighbourhood
Unit, a Scheme of
Arrangement for the
Family-LifeCommunity’,
Monograph One,
Neighbourhood and
Community Planning,
Regional Plan of
New York and Its
Environs (New York,
Committee on Regional
Plan of New York and Its
environs, 1929), p. 88.
(Used with the
Permission of the
Regional Plan
Association, New York).
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which we judge interventions into the city at the
scale of sustainable community. In the context of
the development of Stuyvesant Town in 1947 (Fig.
2), Augur asked ‘is Stuyvesant Town an example of
neighbourhood unit development? Certainly, it is
not the familiar type—an open residential section
housing a thousand families or so, set off by bound-
ary streets or greenbelts and strongly centred in a
school. Yet it has features that are pertinent to the
planning of new residential districts, both in
6
The housing project, spatial
experimentation and legal transformation
in mid-twentieth century New York City
Tarsha Finney
C
ol
ou
r
on
lin
e,
B/
W
in
pr
in
t
Figure 2. Stuyvesant
Town, 1949; architects:
Irwin Clavin, H.F
Richardson, George
Gore and Andrew
J. Eken, under Gilmore
D. Clark. [Source to be
confirmed by the
Author at proof stage.]
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New York and elsewhere.’ He continued that the
social unity and strength that Stuyvesant Town
gained from its large size is ‘the quality sought in
the planning of residential neighbourhood units’.18
It is certainly a critical reflective response to the
diagram of the neighbourhood unit—regardless of
its size.19
Central to Perry’s 1929 plan is the relationship
between space and organisation understood to be
held in a kind of dynamic equilibrium. As well as bor-
rowing heavily from the spatial organisation of the
earlier work of planners such as Ebenezer Howard,
these ideas leant heavily on work emerging from
the Chicago School of Sociology in the first
decades of the twentieth century. In 1925 Robert
Park wrote, in an essay entitled ‘Suggestions for
the Investigation of Human Behaviour in the Urban
Environment’: ‘It is important to know what are
the forces which tend to break up the tensions,
interests and sentiments which give neighbour-
hoods their individual character. In general, these
may be said to be anything that tends to render
the neighbourhood unstable, to divide and concen-
trate attentions upon widely separated objects of
interest.’ He then suggests that one ask the follow-
ing questions: ‘what part of the population is float-
ing? Of what elements, i.e. races, classes etc. is
this population composed? How many people live
in hotels, apartments and tenements? How many
people own their own homes? What portion of
the population consists of nomads, hobos,
gypsies?’20 Unlike the zoned infrastructure of cities
that would emerge toward the second half of the
twentieth century, these ‘moral neighbourhoods’
are understood to be in an unstable equilibrium.
Writing sometime later in The New Yorker, in an
article entitled ‘Home Remedies for Urban Cancer’,
Lewis Mumford, in a reference to the problem of
blight asked: ‘what are the best possible urban pat-
terns today for renovating our disordered cities’.21
The answer for Mumford was to be found in the
neighbourhood unit, with its population thresholds,
its community held in a productive but unstable
equilibrium and the network of relationships cen-
tered around the ‘school, church, market, clinic,
park, library, tavern eating house, theatre’.22 Isin,
Osborne and Rose have more recently argued that
the task of this kind of patterned spatial reasoning
and organisation of the city ‘ … is to restore their
homogeneity and allow the re-alignment of spatial
and moral zones—to return the city to its promise
of happiness’.23 The early neighbourhood unit, in
its multi-scalar instrumentality, in its provision for
the complex interaction of work, home, transport
and leisure, argues for a nuanced and complex set
of relationships in the city, a set of concerns that
have emerged in the nineteenth and twentieth
century as fundamental to the functioning of
liberal democracy itself as part of governmental
reasoning. As we shall see, it is the diagrammatic
ground and the reference point for arguments
around blight, and part of the consequent defini-
tional transformation of the notion of public use
within the Fifth Amendment of the US Consti-
tution.24
In this context, reference to ‘governance’ or ‘gov-
ernmentality’ is not reference to a specific doctrine
of political or economic theory. Rather, following
Michel Foucault’s definition of liberal government,
it is understood as a practice of critique of state
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reason that examines the limitations and actual pos-
sibilities of government.25 As Barth argues: ‘Liberal
government consists of the various instruments
and rationalities assembled to link the power of
the state, the regulation of populations, and a “pas-
toral” power which addressed itself to the conduct
of those who recognized themselves as subjects.
This raises the genealogical question of an art of
government directed toward the conduct of all and
each, in their individuality and uniformity, and
which furthermore emphasizes the freedom of the
subject as a central part of that art’.26 For Foucault,
liberal governmentality was a mode of thinking con-
cerned primarily with the art of government present
as much within socialism as it is within the capitalist
democracies of Western Europe and North America,
accounting for why we can see the same spatial
reasoning at work in pre- and post-revolutionary
China as we see in various degrees in North
America, Brazil, the UK, France, Australia—and the
City of New York at the same time through the
neighbourhood unit. Liberal Governmentality as a
practice ‘seeks to identify how government is poss-
ible, what it needs to know and what it cannot
know’.27 Urban spatial reasoning or the spatial
arrangement of functioning collectives of population
has formed an important part of that practice. Key to
this is through the first half of the twentieth century
which has been a testing time for the stable relation-
ship between home, work, leisure and transport at
the scale of the neighbourhood. As can be seen in
a series of large housing projects through the
middle of the twentieth century in New York, by
means of the constitutive elements of neighbour-
hood, there is an iterative search for the size of
stability within a spatial reasoning: The Braunn and
Munschenheim slum clearance proposal from
1934; Williamsburg Houses, 1938; Queensbridge
Houses, 1940; Stuyvesant Town, 1947; Brownsville
Houses, 1948; Fresh Meadows, 1949; and many
others.
Urban redevelopment and renewal in the City
of New York, 1890–1940
The period from 1890 to the 1940s was a period of
intense urban expansion in cities across America, but
particularly in the City of New York. It was a period
that saw huge conflicts amongst urban reformers,
philanthropists, industrialists and property interests
in the building and delivery of housing and the clear-
ing of cities of what were deemed to be unsanitary
and unsafe building fabric.
Already during the 1920s and into the 1930s in
New York City there was a paralysis in the pro-
duction of public housing with a split emerging
and two parallel disputes among housing reformers.
The first of these concerned a question of what the
best mechanisms were for changing the housing
and living conditions of the poor. On the one
hand, there was a belief in the legislation of tene-
ments as a way of forcing landlords to upgrade
and adjust their buildings; private philanthropy and
model tenement buildings would then supplement
this. On the other hand, there was a different
group of reformers who were advocating the
provision of government-funded public-housing
programmes based on European models of high-
quality, low-cost housing. This conflict, then, was
between private philanthropy and legislative
reform, on the one hand, and fully publicly-funded
8
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government housing programmes on the other, a
conflict that continued well into the 1940s.
In addition to this, there was a second dispute. It
was connected to the first, but was concerned
with the role of slum clearance in either of these pos-
itions. For one group, that included the social
workers Mary Kingsbury Simkhovitch and Helen
Alfred of New York and conservative reformers
such as Bleecker Marquette of Cincinnati and
Bernard Newman of Philadelphia, low-cost housing
was to be provided by philanthropy and through
the legislation of tenement reform, where it was
understood that ‘the way to improve the lives of
the poor was through housing’, and that eliminating
slums was essential to achieving this goal. In opposi-
tion to this were housing reformers such as Cathe-
rine Bauer, and the architects Henry Wright and
Oscar Stonorov, who believed that good public
housing on vacant land at the outskirts of cities
would eventually persuade slum dwellers to leave
their tenements and relocate, thereby eliminating
the need for condemnation and eminent domain
proceedings. Either way, in the 1920s and 1930s
slum clearance had great political and public
appeal, quite distinct and separate from the ques-
tion of housing itself. This was supported by the
powerful and constitutive imagery produced by the
muckrakers, those realist photographers, photo-
journalists and writers that worked to ‘expose’ cor-
ruption and scandal in business and politics, and
labour and living conditions in US and European
cities through the second half of the nineteenth
century.28
In addition to this, by the 1940s there emerged in
New York an intense dispute around the question of
who would produce the housing in either of these
scenarios. A conservative alliance of building, prop-
erty banking and chamber of commerce organis-
ations opposed state funding for public housing on
the grounds that it was a ‘socialistic’ intrusion into
the private market. Sitting in opposition to this
group was a liberal coalition that included the
Truman Administration, social welfare groups,
trades unions, housing organisations and the US
Conference of Mayors.29 This second group
argued that public housing was essential to any
urban revival: cities needed public housing, they
claimed, as a mechanism to help redevelop slums,
and to alleviate the post-war housing shortage—
and that it was the state’s role to be involved in
the delivery of this.30
Many attempts were made to bridge the divide
between these two groups. As I have shown pre-
viously, already by the early 1930s proposals for
very large areas of slum clearance were being
made, such as the Brounn and Muschenheim (B +
M) slum clearance proposal for fifty blocks of the
Lower East Side, which saw great value in making
room and clearing space out of the incredibly
dense and crowded old and new law tenements of
Manhattan and the other Boroughs of New York
(Fig. 3).31 The B +M proposal was made in the
context of the introduction of the 1926 Limited divi-
dend Housing Companies Act that allowed munici-
palities to use eminent domain for site assembly
and slum clearance.32 The New York Governor,
Alfred Smith, said at the time of announcing the
new law: ‘I do so with the sincere hope that it may
prove the beginning of a lasting movement to
wipe out of our State those blots on civilization,
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Figure 3. Brounn and
Muschenheim, 1934:
‘Incremental Moves in
Proposal for Slum
Clearance and fifty
block housing project,
Manhattan.’ (Source:
Muschenheim archive,
Avery Architectural and
Fine Arts Library,
Drawings and Archives,
Columbia University.)
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the old, dilapidated, dark, unsanitary, unsafe tene-
ment houses that long since became fit for human
habitation and certainly are no place for future citi-
zens of New York to grow in’.33
Economic interests, such as the National Associ-
ation of Real Estate Boards (NAREB), campaigned
intensively against public housing throughout the
1930s, taking the lead in the search for a national
urban-redevelopment policy. This was because
members were against public housing on ideological
grounds, the belief being that housing projects com-
peted with private business but did not pay taxes
and were seen therefore as the ‘opening wedge in
an eventual takeover of the private housing industry
by the government… and undermined the initiative
and independence of American citizens’.34 Its
members and executive director Herbert U. Nelson
fundamentally believed in ‘free enterprise, and
sought ways to redevelop slums that would give
full sway to private entrepreneurs’.35 NAREB were
instrumental in convincing a conservative Congress
to stop funding the federal assistance programme
for public housing established under the 1937
Wagner-Steagall Housing Act.36 And yet, despite
this critique of publicly-funded housing, there was
a general agreement for the removal of blight and
slums. However, what remained for either of these
groups was the difficulty in developing tenements.
The reasons were complex: the problem of land
assembly and the associated costs had existed
throughout the late nineteenth century. This was
equally the case for urban reformers. Also during
the 1920s and 1930s, whilst inner-city industrial
and low-income residential areas might have been
unsightly, they were generally profitable. They
were typically ‘located near city centres and major
transportation routes’; these sites were in demand
for factories, stores and low-rent residences. In
addition there was the added expense of demolition
and rebuilding once assembly was achieved. What
was needed was a galvanising argument that
allowed for a designation of a problem and the inte-
grated proposition of a solution—‘blight’ provided
this diagnostic and propositional tool, uniting
private developers, property interests, social refor-
mers, philanthropists and government agencies, all
interested in the transformation of the city: by
means of the mechanism of eminent domain, the
compulsory acquisition of land.
The contagion of blight
On Stuyvesant Town’s completion, Auger wrote that
‘The greatest danger to successful urban redevelop-
ment is that it will be attempted in a timid, piecemeal
fashion and will fail for that one reason… little
islands of redevelopment in a big sea of blight
have little chance of survival’.37
Blight is a notoriously difficult term to define. As
early as 1918 William Stanton stated that a blighted
area ‘is a district which is not what it should be’,38
without really clarifying any further what it should
actually be. A 1932 Report from the President’s Con-
ference on Home Building and Homeownership
offered a clarification that, whilst a blighted area
could be defined as an area that was an economic
liability to a community, a slum on the other hand
was a social liability to a community.39 There is a
sense that a blighted area has a tendency to
spread, decay, to move inexorably towards a state
of degeneration and atrophy, a kind of pre-con-
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dition of the slum. Its designation has transformed
through time. Initially it was indicated by evidence
of dilapidation, abandoned and deteriorating build-
ings, as well as health concerns over the spread of
disease. One recognises in these descriptions the
general social reform agenda of the first half of the
twentieth century. More recently, definitions of
blight have included ‘too-small side yards’, ‘diverse
ownership’, ‘inadequate planning’ and lack of ‘a
two-car garage’.40 Quintin commented in 1958 on
the Federal Urban Renewal Program that: ‘All large
and most middle-sized American cities have exten-
sive areas of blight with immediate prospects of
these areas spreading. Blight is not restricted to resi-
dential neighbourhoods but includes commercial
and industrial areas as well. It is usually located in
central cities, but some suburban communities
have blighted areas and the amount of suburban
blight will probably increase rapidly.… . Statistical
data on the amount of blight is very limited and
unsatisfactory’.41 Urban authorities found it difficult
to measure blight quantitatively. yet as we have
seen, they believed they knew what it looked like.
Further descriptions of blight from the 1950s
account for its symptoms being: economic deterio-
ration, such as declining property value; high inci-
dence of tax delinquency, or low average rents;
the existence of social problems, including a high
incidence of delinquency and crime; the over-occu-
pancy of dwelling units; and premises not main-
tained.42 By the mid-1950s blight was also
understood to affect non-residential properties,
characteristics of which included: ‘Dilapidation and
deterioration of structures; inadequate original con-
struction; inadequate basic building utilities and
facilities; obsolete or obsolescent building types;
improper building location, coverage, and use of
land; inadequate or unsatisfactory public facilities
or utilities; adverse influences from noise, smoke,
and fumes. The symptoms of non-residential blight
being economic deterioration, such as growing tax
delinquency or migration of firms from the area
and premises improperly maintained’.43
Blighted property is understood in terms of fears
that it had the capacity to spread, it is even described
in terms such as ‘cancer’. Blight is also understood to
be a thing that can be intervened in; it was seen to
endanger the future of the city which, if not
excised, would spread and destroy it.44
On what grounds can one ‘take’: eminent
domain, legitimacy and blight
It is within the exercise of physical takings and on the
occasion of the jurisprudential testing of the public-
use clause within eminent domain that the useful-
ness of the ambiguity of blight can be powerfully
seen. There is a widely held assumption that funda-
mental to sovereignty in the United States is the
power of eminent domain. At the same time, and
in contradiction, there is also a long-held, self-
evident truth that the government, state or federal,
cannot simply take the property or land of one
person and give it to another. However, a review
of the use of eminent domain through the twentieth
century reveals both of these statements to be incor-
rect. The United States Federal Government did not
assert its power of eminent domain in its own name,
in its own courts, until 1875, with Kohl v. United
States.45 And, as Prichett has argued, the taking of
private land to give to another person is precisely
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what the Federal Government has been doing under
the Fifth Amendment of the US Constitution:46 ‘nor
shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation’.47
The question of just compensation here is hardly
ever controversial. It is generally established on the
grounds of market value and resolved quickly. The
question on which any challenge to the use of
eminent domain is made in the courts is based on
that of public use. However, prior to establishing a
question of compensation or making a challenge
on the grounds of public use, the question of rel-
evance to law needs to be established. Because
this opens up a conceptual field of what exactly con-
stitutes property rights, it is worth considering the
difference between regulatory and physical takings.
Physical taking of land is different from land that is
subject to an ordinary regulation to which a property
owner is required to submit.48 An ordinary regu-
lation may be understood as, for example, a
zoning law that changes the value of a property,
or it could be a change in the status of unimproved
land, its protection as a wetland area by an adminis-
trative environmental conservation agency for
example, an agency that then has no responsibility
to compensate the private property owner for lost
value due to this change.49 This is in contrast to
the form of taking whereby the government, state
or federal, exercises its power of eminent domain
and is able to compel a property owner to give up
a property for ‘public use’ in return for compen-
sation. Much attention in scholarly writing has
been paid to regulatory taking and whether or not
‘efficiency and justice’ require the government to
compensate property owners for this regulatory
taking.50 This makes sense when one considers the
question of what constitutes property rights. Some
have argued that, rather than property rights being
a total right, which is the common-sense account,
instead it should be understood as a bundle of
minor rights that collectively give an individual
sole-use rights, accounting for why the minor
erosion of that bundle might be seen as such a
cause for concern.51
Once the issue of compensation is resolved and
the question of relevance is addressed, then the
grounds for challenging the designation of physical
takings pivots on these questions: on what
grounds can the state ‘compel’? What is the
ground of legitimacy which the state claims when
it takes the property of an individual to share the
benefit with the many? This specific point has
been the focus of continual court challenge in the
United States since the 1890s.52 The question of
what definition constitutes ‘public use’ is key. This
is also where blight’s use value can be seen as part
of the broader spatial reasoning at work through a
discursive diagram such as the neighbourhood
unit, and as part of disputes around urban change
and transformation in the city.53
What is the right size of stable community?
State-based eminent domain takings had not been
generally reviewed in the federal Supreme Court
forum until the 1890s, and only after the limit-
ations of the Fifth Amendment on federal takings
were applied to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment, in 1868, as part of a suite of recon-
struction amendments brought about following
the US Civil War.54
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Legal accounts of this move, such as an editorial in
the Yale Law Journal (YLJ) from 1949, argue that
prior to the adoption of the federal and early state
constitutions, government rarely needed privately
owned land, so the issue of taking had rarely
emerged. The editors wrote: ‘the abundance of
unimproved and unoccupied private lands made
the few instances of government acquisition rela-
tively painless’.55 As government activity expanded
through the industrial nineteenth century, they
argue, the definition of these terms became key
for property-owners threatened with expropriation
who attempted to show that the proposed takings
were for projects unrelated to the public good.56
The YLJ continues that the increasing pressure of
industrialisation on the country generally led to the
courts seeking to limit the exercise of eminent
domain in the interest of protecting private property
through clarifying definitions of ‘public use’.’
However, such a reading of the law’s instrumentality
in terms of urban change fails to see the iterative
transformative agency that the spatial and typologi-
cal experimentation into the size and scale of neigh-
bourhood had during this period. It is on the
occasion of the coming into form of the housing
project along a trajectory of similar projects that it
is possible to see this agency in operation.
At state level, and by the mid-nineteenth century,
the definition of public use was becoming narrower.
A distinction was drawn between a purpose ben-
eficial to the public and a purpose in which the
public had a ‘right of use’.57 Initially, ‘the indirect
contribution to the prosperity of the entire commu-
nity’, which came about as a result of activities
that only a few individuals would profit from, was
not sufficient to justify the exercise of eminent
domain.58 The distinction between these two
ideas, right to use and purpose beneficial to the
public, however, left in place many questions:
What proportion of the public must have a right to
use; what about payment for the privilege of using
the thing for which eminent domain was deployed;
‘where public utilities took property by eminent
domain, would not private individuals alone—the
stockholders—profit directly from the taking’?59
By the 1890s, and in early federal condemnation
cases in which the question of public use was
raised, two streams of enquiry emerge simul-
taneously. The first was a question of whether the
use was in fact a public one; the second was
whether the federal government had the consti-
tutional power to condemn for the proposed
public use.60
On the second of these issues, that of consti-
tutional power, it was implied that the Supreme
Court in early cases had the power to condemn
and take, as part of those powers expressly del-
egated to it by the Constitution, that is, by the
states.61 In addition to eminent domain, these
federal powers have included: the commerce
power, the power to raise armies and the power to
legislate for the District of Columbia, ie, Washing-
ton. As a consequence of a series of early challenges
to it by the Supreme Court on the grounds of
eminent domain, and as part of a definitional chal-
lenge more broadly, questions then began to
emerge of what in fact the transforming role of
the United States Federal Government was. The
extent of this is evidenced in a case regarding
Native-American land claims from 1939. In this
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instance, the federal government had first to prove
or establish that it had the constitutional power to
act as the guardian of native people: an open ques-
tion prior to this. Only once this was established,
could it in fact then act in their interest—‘a profound
question of sovereign definition and responsibility
with significant consequences regarding citizenship
beyond simply the issue of a specific land claim’.62
Once the role of the Federal Government was
transformed to meet the question of the court, the
question of whether the use was in fact a public
one could be addressed. During the 1940s there
had been a tendency in the lower federal courts to
blend the two limitations of public use and consti-
tutional power into one issue, where questions of
definitions of sovereignty were brought together
around issues of blight. This was to counter a per-
ceived threat from excess condemnation. Excess
condemnation was the practice of taking more
property than was actually necessary for the creation
of public improvement, and then subsequently
selling or leasing the surplus land, often, it is
argued, as a way of recovering costs.63 Another
way of considering this excess claim of property,
and positioned within the spatial reasoning at
work in the neighbourhood unit, is that predicating
all of these actions is a question as to the size of the
unit of stable population and spatial organisation.
Excess condemnation argued on the occasion of
blight provided a method of controlling the develop-
ment of an area immediately surrounding a public
improvement. If the size of community/neighbour-
hood was the question on the table being iteratively
worked with, one would need room to flex that
reasoning. Along with a series of regulatory and leg-
islative mechanisms developed in the early decades
of the twentieth century, such as the public auth-
ority,64 excess condemnation worked to link a ques-
tion of space with a question regarding the size of
governance and therefore planning. It fundamen-
tally asked the question: at what size should we
govern? Excess condemnation can be understood
as a tool that enabled this search for the size of func-
tioning balanced spatial units.65
What this paper has attempted to show in the
specific context of New York City is that it is precisely
the functional ambiguity of blight that is so valuable
to it as a discursive strategy. As it gets called on to
justify the grounds of legitimacy in physical
takings, and as part of the jurisprudential testing
of the public-use clause within the Fifth Amend-
ment, blight operates to galvanise dispute cultivated
as part of a continual process of formal, spatial and
material experimentation into the size of stable
neighbourhood and community. This is a process
in which the discipline of architecture is profoundly
engaged, but that it has only limited agency over.
Projects such as Stuyvesant Town, and the diagram
of the neighbourhood unit that was involved in its
production, is not a reflection of legal change, but
rather legal change is being driven by means of an
iterative process of spatial testing on the occasion
of housing, and as part of jurisprudential testing of
the public-use clause in physical takings. There is
change in the definition of law at a state and
federal level, but also definitional change within
the US constitution itself as jurisprudential challenge
makes its way through the Supreme Courts and
questions of Sovereign responsibility are asked.
Rather than seeing the single architectural object
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as a mute reflection of legal change, what this
suggests is that there is a direct material politics
evident in a trajectory of experimentation through
a number of projects, as architecture’s material
and formal skill set nudge at the edge of law, chal-
lenging and transforming it as part of a consistent
questioning of the size of stable neighbourhoods.
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